Paper Title:
The Game Analysis of Rent-Seeking Behavior in the Public Project
  Abstract

Rent-seeking behavior in the public project is a problem which the construction administrative departments at all levels always attach great importance to. This paper analyzed the causes and harms of rent-seeking behavior in the public project. At the same time, according to the hypothesis that supervision department can drive its right impartially, this paper established a tripartite incomplete information static game model in the public project, and then analyzed the own rent-seeking behavior of supervision department, and got the specific measures that could reduce rent-seeking behavior.

  Info
Periodical
Chapter
Chapter 8: Engineering Management
Edited by
Xuejun Zhou
Pages
2233-2237
DOI
10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.94-96.2233
Citation
K. Jiang, Y. Peng, Y. S. Chen, "The Game Analysis of Rent-Seeking Behavior in the Public Project", Applied Mechanics and Materials, Vols. 94-96, pp. 2233-2237, 2011
Online since
September 2011
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Price
$32.00
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