Paper Title:
Screening Model in Enterprise Competitive Intelligence Activity
  Abstract

The paper researched the screening model in enterprise competitive intelligence activity based on game theory. It studied the service provider’s decision in competitive intelligence(CI) project and proved it could be satisfied with Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It also revealed the heterogeneity between the service providers through a signaling game model in which signal set was the combine of CI quality standard term. The result shows that a quality standard about CI should be designed in contract which provides a signal for service provider to self-certify its own true type and is in favor of screening for enterprise.

  Info
Periodical
Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 121-122)
Edited by
Donald C. Wunsch II, Honghua Tan, Dehuai Zeng, Qi Luo
Pages
360-363
DOI
10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.121-122.360
Citation
H. D. Yu, F. Liu, Y. F. Luo, "Screening Model in Enterprise Competitive Intelligence Activity", Advanced Materials Research, Vols. 121-122, pp. 360-363, 2010
Online since
June 2010
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Price
$32.00
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