Paper Title:
Analyzing Manufacturer’s R&D Equilibrium in Defense Procurement
  Abstract

We formulate the model of R&D investment scale adjustment of defense procurement by applying game theory and contest theory and study the equilibrium of manufacturers’ R&D investment decision-making in defense procurement. We explore mainly the influence of valuation of monopolistic contract and differences among manufacturers’ abilities on investment. The conclusion shows that manufacturers’ investment equilibrium of R&D projects is what the government expects under certain conditions, however, manufacturers’ abilities effect on the investment equilibrium and makes it deviate from the government expectation. Therefore, the government must keep practically manufacturers’ anticipation about the monopolistic contact being consistent with government’s and set basic admission criterion to enable manufactures’ ability well-matched to induce the manufacturers’ investment decisions to the investment equilibrium that it desired.

  Info
Periodical
Key Engineering Materials (Volumes 474-476)
Edited by
Garry Zhu
Pages
1435-1439
DOI
10.4028/www.scientific.net/KEM.474-476.1435
Citation
S. L. Chen, X. D. Liu, "Analyzing Manufacturer’s R&D Equilibrium in Defense Procurement", Key Engineering Materials, Vols. 474-476, pp. 1435-1439, 2011
Online since
April 2011
Export
Price
$32.00
Share

In order to see related information, you need to Login.

In order to see related information, you need to Login.

Authors: Sheng Li Chen
Abstract:We formulate respectively the outsourcing service competition models with simultaneous and sequential decision order and analyze the...
31
Authors: Ye Zhou, Hui He, Yan Feng Wang
Abstract:The emission of greenhouse gases leading to global climate warming has caused widespread concern on the part of governments worldwide....
736
Authors: Xin Xu
Chapter 7: Construction Project Management
Abstract:This paper analyzed the cooperation between construction enterprises in game theory. Research shows construction enterprises in building...
2793
Authors: Hong Ren, Fei Xu
Chapter 5: Applied Computer Technologies and Control
Abstract:Driven by benefit and asymmetrical information, collusion behaviors occur between Supervisors and construction enterprises in the process of...
723
Authors: Zhen Guo Han, Wen Ju Wang, Lie Rong Qing
Chapter 4: Management and Economy
Abstract:Though the auction existed for a long time, the research on the auction theory has been started formally since 1961. One of the prerequisites...
432