Papers by Keyword: Game

Abstract: People fear something, as the feeling is normal for a person. Fear reactions are essential for survival. Fear will triggered whenever an individual facing something scary or even confronted with something new that seems potentially dangerous. Phobia on the other hand is an intense feeling of fear towards objects, animals, activities, situations or persons. However, many people do not know they suffered from phobia. Any fear during childhood might develop into phobias. People with phobias are most likely to avoid any place or situation that might trigger their fear so that they feel relief. They also keep their phobia to themselves and not telling other people about it. Besides, they are most likely refuse to go to receive treatment from psychiatrist or therapist. This is due to the norm of the society that seeing psychiatrist or therapist means that person suffering from mental health, which is embarrassing. This paper identified the types of phobia among Malaysian for preliminary investigation for reducing phobia through gaming approach. The quantitative method based on questionnaires, which contains of 18 questions used in the random online survey. The set of questions are adapted from Fear of Spiders Questionnaire. The higher the marks are the higher the state of phobia of the individuals will be. It is hope that by identifying the types of phobia may use to suggest an alternative gaming tool in reducing phobia.

Abstract: Based on the perspective of green economy and FDI competition, this article establishes revenue matrix game, resolves game revenue function between stakeholders, by defining the performance of environmental regulation stakeholders variable. The results show that in the light of heavy economic performance as the target function, the local government has to relax the environment regulation as the means to fight the mobility factor motivation . In addition, the local government’s environmental regulation will actively promote enterprise technological innovation to improve the performance of environmental regulation.

Abstract: With the wide use of internet and we-media, the process of emergency treatment of government developed into the process of information transmission and the game of the stakeholders. Firstly, the formation of this process has been demonstrated. Then from the perspective of government we analyzed the constitution of game, the types and the interest demands of stakeholders. And then from the perspective of the game we analyzed the emergency behavior and the profit of the government. The game model was constructed based on the transmission of information, so as to provide a reasonable explanation for the emergence disposal of government. Finally, according to the study some suggestions for government have been given.

Abstract: The rapid development of economy, changed the original enterprise development goals, from the pursuit of economic interests to bear social responsibility is a huge transformation, and the staff as the core enterprise. Employees are paying more and more attention. In this paper, the private voluntary provision of public goods game model analysis the performance of China' corporate social responsibility to employees voluntarily,and it arrives at the conclusion that China's large enterprises are willing to bear the social responsibility for the staff, and small enterprises just are hitchhike. Finally, combined with the actual situation in China, in our implementation of corporate social responsibility to employees and provide advice.

Abstract: The third-party certification industry in China has been gradually stepping on the right track. However, it has not yet gained a foothold in rural building material market. Since the “12th Five-Year Plan” came into being, the new countryside construction is extremely urgent. Therefore, it is very necessary to establish a third-party certification system to regulate and standardize rural building material market. By using the game theory method, this paper analyzed the operating model of third-party certification organization under the economy of monopoly market, and put forward the third-party certification system which was suitable for rural building material market, in the meanwhile, proposed several suggestions in the management models of certification organization for government supervision departments.

Abstract: Because the corruption occurs sometimes in Government construction projects of China, the paper develops the game model of Bidders and Owners. Then, by analyzing the model, we find that if increased the probability of conspiracy supervised (discovery possibilities) and increased the intensity of punishment, it will reduce the probability of Bidder Conspiracy Risk (CR). The findings are helpful for the China Government to regulate the bidding policies to prevent the corruption risk.

Abstract: A with the rapid development of e-commerce, the influence of online retailers gradually increased, vendors sell their products through online retailers have become an inevitable choice in the era of e-commerce. Vendors and online retailers have fundamental differences in the channel control, distribution of benefits, resulting in the presence of both cooperation and competition between the two sides. In this paper, using replicator dynamics model, combined with non-symmetric matrix, analysis of evolution trend between independent Internet retailers and suppliers cooperation competition game, and proposes relevant suggestions accordingly trend.

Abstract: The aim of this interactive game is a thorough insight into industrial engineering method called SMED (Single Minute Exchange of Die). This method is focused on reducing changeover time of machines or lines. The rapid changeover is nowadays one of the most important issues ensuring a sufficient flexibility of an enterprise. SMED game is designed for a flexible usage in terms of number of players involved in the game and length of playing time. Specifically, it is usable for one to twelve players and playing time can be set from one to four hours. Main goal of the game is an application of entire conception of SMED method.

Abstract: Power exchange needs to design a mechanism, which can achieve the internalization of environmental costs of power generation enterprises, thus maximizing the social environmental benefits. Two-stage optimization models of energy-saving and emission-reducing for coal-fired power plant are established. In the first stage model, maximums of the social environmental benefits and energy-saving effect are taken as the objective functions with consideration of the unit output constraints, load constraints and emissions constraints, etc. In the second stage model, maximums of power generation enterprises profits are taken as the objective functions with the constraints of KKT conditions of the first stage model. The proposed marginal incentive pricing mechanism not only controlls CO₂ emissions from the total amount, but also improves emissions treatment initiative of coal-fired power generation enterprises. A numerical example shows that the proposed model and algorithm can achieve the effect of saving energy, reducing emission and encouraging competition during the process of generation.

Abstract: The paper analyzed the necessity of PPP governmental supervision game on the basis of existed infrastructure government supervision and analyzed the policy, market and public benefit risk of private sectors, whereupon determined the setup of framework for PPP program government supervision. Supervision will mainly cover the following items: market access; service quality; service price; external supervision; social fairness etc. Lastly, the paper established ethnic risk model of private sector, and came to the following conclusion: degree of ethnic risk is positive correlated with the additional revenue from evil conduct y and market interest rate r, and is negative correlated with the reward from franchised business W, possibility of discovering evil conduct Po, fines derived from punishment of evil conduct D, term of franchised operation t, period of default i and reward declining amount x.