A Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption System Against Malicious KGC

Guoyan Zhang^{1, a}

¹ School of Computer Science and Technology, Shandong University, Shandong Provincial Key Laboratory of Software Engineering, Jinan, P.R China

^aGuoyanzhang@sdu.edu.cn

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Abstract. Attribute-based encryption scheme is a scheme in which each user is identified by a set of attributes, and some function of those attributes is used to determine decryption ability for each ciphertext. Similar with identity-based encryption scheme, attribute-based schemes are also confronted with key escrow problem. Furthermore, the attributes belonging to a user usually are monitored by different authorities. This paper resolves the two problems by using a general attribute-based encryption scheme and K-Sibling intractable function families. In our construction, different attributes sets of a user are still certified by different authorities, but the partial private keys corresponding to the attributes are generated by a central authority. Simultaneously, different authorities jointly generate the users' secret value which cannot be obtained by the central authority. Compared with general multi-authority attributed-based encryption scheme, our approach has more efficiency.

Introduction

With the development of the internet, expressive access-control is becoming more and more a key technology, where access decisions depend upon attributes of the protected data and access policies assigned to users. A natural solution for expressive access-control is attribute-based encryption (ABE) introduced by Sahai and Waters [1]. Following, two variants of ABE were subsequently proposed: key-policy variant (KP-ABE) of Goyal, Pandey, Sahai and Waters (GPSW) [2] and ciphertext-policy variant (CP-ABE) of Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters (BSW) [3]. In order to make the access structure more expressive, many schemes have been presented [2,3,4,5,6,7,8]. Simultaneously, schemes [6,9,10,11] were devoted to get constant-size ciphertexts.

With the increasing number of international cooperation among different organization and department, the attributes belonging to a user usually are monitored by different authorities. Furthermore, similar to identity-based encryption schemes, the attribute-based schemes encounters key escrow problem. One approach to mitigate the above two problems is to employ multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme, which is an attractive solution and successfully avoids placing trust in a single entity by making the system distributed. However, this solution comes at the cost of introducing extra infrastructure and communication.

Related Work

Building on the ideas from [12], Chase proposed a solution for multi-authority attribute-based encryption, provided that a trusted central authority is available [13], but a global identifier is a "linchpin" for tying users' keys together. Müller, Katzenbeisser, and Eckert [14,15] give a system with a centralized authority that realizes any LSSS access structure. Their proof is limited to non-adaptive queries. The system achieves roughly the same functionality as the engineering approach above, except one can still acquire attributes from additional authorities without revisiting the central authority. The scheme [16] removed the central authority using a distributed PRF,

however, the same limitations of an AND policy of a determined set of authorities remained. Lin et. al. [17] give a threshold-based scheme that is also somewhat decentralized. The set of authorities is fixed ahead of time, and they must interact during the system setup. Scheme [18] proposes a new multi-authority attribute-based encryption system.

Preliminaries

Definition 1 (Decisional Modified Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (MBDH) Assumption). Suppose a challenger chooses $a, b, c, z \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ at random. The Decisional MBDH assumption is that no polynomial-time adversary is to be able to distinguish the tuple $(A = g^a, B = g^b, C = g^c, Z = e(g, g)^{\frac{abc}{c}})$ from $(A = g^a, B = g^b, C = g^c, Z = e(g, g)^z)$ with more than a negligible advantage.

Definition 2 (K-Sibling Intractable Function Families) Let $k = k(n)$ be a polynomial with $k \geq 1$. Let $H = \{H_n \mid n \in N\}$, where $H_n = \{h \mid h : \Sigma^{l(n)} \rightarrow \Sigma^{m(n)}\}$, be a family of functions that is one-way, polynomial time computable and samplable, and that has the collision accessibility property. Also let $X = x_1, x_2, \dots, x_i$ be any set of i initial strings, where $1 \leq i \leq k$. H is a k -sibling intractable function family, or simply k -SIFF, if for each $1 \leq i \leq k$, for each sibling finder F , for each polynomial Q , and for all sufficiently large n , $Pr[F(X, h) \neq ?] < 1/Q(n)$, where h is chosen randomly and uniformly from $H_n^X \in H_n$, the set of all functions in H_n that map $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_i$ to the same strings in $\Sigma^{m(n)}$, and the probability $Pr[F(X, h) \neq ?]$ is computed over $H_n^X \in H_n$ and the sample space of all finite strings of coin flips that F could have tossed.

A General Construction for Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme

We assume that there are n attribute authorities, and every attribute authority k monitors d_k attributes, and there are r users. Let (Setup'; SecretKeyExtract'; Encryption'; Decryption') be an IND-CPA secure attribute-based encryption scheme, $H = \{H_n : n \in N\}$ be a k -sibling intractable function family, where $H_n = \{h_n : \Sigma^{l(n)} \rightarrow \Sigma^{m(n)}\}$. $G = \{G_n : n \in N\}$ is a pseudo-random function families, where $G_n = \{g_n : \Sigma^{l'(n)} \rightarrow \Sigma^{l(n)}\}$ and $F = \{F_n : n \in N\}$ is a one-way trapdoor function family, where $F_n = \{f_n : \Sigma^{q(n)} \rightarrow \Sigma^{z(n)}\}$. Let (Setup; PartialPrivateKeyExtract; SetSecretValue; SetPrivateKey; SetPublicKey; Encrypt; Decrypt) be the attribute-based certificateless encryption scheme from the above attribute-based encryption scheme, k -sibling intractable function families and one-way trapdoor function, and the construction is as follows:

-SetUp: Central authority runs Setup' of attribute-based encryption scheme to get the master secret key msk and master public key mpk . The master public key mpk includes a description of the ciphertext space C .

-AuthorityCertify: In order to certify the attribute set i for user $A_i, i = 1, 2, \dots, r$, attribute authority k generates signature $Sign_{s_k}(i, A_i)$ and sends this signature to the central authority with verifying secret key v_k . (s_k, v_k) is signature and verification secret key pair of authority k .

-PartialPrivateKeyExtract: Given the master public key mpk , master secret key msk , an attributes set $S_{A_i} \in U$ and its signature, the central authority verifies the validity of the signatures. If so, he runs PPT algorithm SecretKeyExtract' to generate the partial private key d_{A_i} for this attributes set. Then the partial private key d_{A_i} is transported to entity A_i over a confidential and authentic channel.

-SetSecretValue: Each authority chooses his secret key sk_k . Given master public key mpk and attributes set $d_k^i \in U$ as inputs, Authority k computes $y_k^i = g_{sk_k}(d_k^i), (k = 1, 2, \dots, n, i = 1, 2, \dots, r)$, then

chooses an entity to get a $nr+1$ -sibling intractable function h satisfying $h(y_k^i) = x, (k=1,2,\dots,n, i=1,2,\dots,r)$ and publish h , then each authority can compute x , and x is sent to entity A_i as his temporary secret key.

-SetPrivateKey: Given master public key mpk , the entity A_i 's temporary secret key x , and the entity A_i 's partial private key d_{A_i} as input, the entity runs this PPT algorithm to generate a private key SK_{A_i} .

-SetPublicKey: Given master public key mpk and the entity A_i 's temporary secret key x , one-way trapdoor function f with x as its trapdoor is returned.

-Encrypt: Given a plaintext $m \in M$, the ciphertext is $C = \text{Encryption}'(f(m))$

-Decrypt: Given master public key mpk , the entity's private key $SK_{A_i} = (d_{A_i}, x)$ and the ciphertext $C \in C$. If entity's attributes set satisfying the access tree T related with C (ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme), or the attributes related with C satisfies the access tree T (key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme), and then he can get the message as follows:

$$m = f_x^{-1}(\text{Decryption}'_{d_{A_i}}(C)). \quad (1)$$

Otherwise outputs $\perp$.

Concrete Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme Secure against the Malicious KGC

Construction

Let (G, G_T) be bilinear map groups of order $p > 2^k$ and let $e : G \times G \rightarrow G_T$ denote a bilinear map. Let g be a generator for G . k is the security parameter. $\Delta_{i,s}(x), i \in Z_p$ is the Lagrange coefficient, and S is a set of elements in Z_p . U is the universal set of attributes which is associated with a unique element in Z_p^* . Our construction is as follows:

-Setup(d): First, Central authority take the integers $1, 2, \dots, |U|$ to be the universe.

Next, choose $t_1, \dots, t_{|U|}$ uniformly at random from Z_p . Finally, choose y uniformly at random in Z_p .

The published public keys are:

$$T_1 = g^{t_1}, \dots, T_{|U|} = g^{t_{|U|}}, Y = e(g, g)^y.$$

The master key is:

$$t_1, \dots, t_{|U|}, y.$$

Every attribute authority k generates his own signature secret key s_k and verifying secret key v_k .

-AuthorityCertify: in order to certify the attribute d_i^k for user A_i , attribute authority k generates signature $\text{Sign}_{s_k}(A_i, u)$ and sends this signature to the central authority with verifying secret key v_k .

-PartialPrivateKeyExtract: after verifying the signature for attributes set $d^i = (d_1^i, \dots, d_n^i)$ for user A_i , the central authority picks $(d-1)$ degree polynomial q randomly so that $q(0) = y$. The partial private key for user A_i is

$$d_{A_i} = g^{\frac{q(i)}{t_i}}, i \in d^i. \quad (2)$$

-SecretValueExtract: Each authority chooses his secret key sk_k . Given master public key mpk and attributes set $d_k^i \in U$ as inputs, Authority k computes $y_k^i = g_{sk_k}(d_k^i), (k=1,2,\dots,n, i=1,2,\dots,r)$, then chooses an entity to get a $nr+1$ -sibling intractable function h satisfying $h(y_k^i) = x, (k=1,2,\dots,n, i=1,2,\dots,r)$ and publish h , then each authority can compute x , and x is sent to entity A_i as his temporary secret key.

-SetPrivateKey: Given master public key mpk , the entity A_i 's temporary secret key x , and the entity A_i 's partial private key d_{A_i} as input, the entity runs this PPT algorithm to generate a private key SK_{A_i} .

-SetPublicKey: Given master public key mpk and the entity A_i 's temporary secret key x , one-way trapdoor function f with x as its trapdoor is returned.

-Encrypt. In order to encrypt message $m \in G_T$ with attributes set ω' , pick $s \in Z_p$ and compute the ciphertext as follows:

$$C = (C_0, C_1, C_2) = (\omega', f(m) \cdot Y^s, E_i = T_i^s, i \in \omega'). \quad (3)$$

-Decryption.: Suppose that a ciphertext, C is encrypted with a key for attributes set ω' and we have the partial private key d_{A_i} for attributes set ω , where $|\omega \cap \omega'| \geq d$. Choose an arbitrary d -element subset S of $\omega \cap \omega'$ and compute

$$\alpha = p(0) = \sum_{i \in S} p(i) \Delta_{i,s}(0), \quad (4)$$

$$f(m) = C_1 / \prod_{i \in S} (((e(d_{A_i}, E_i))^{\Delta_{i,s}(0)})^\alpha), \quad (5)$$

$$m = f_x^{-1}(f(m)). \quad (6)$$

Correctness:

$$C_1 / \prod_{i \in S} (((e(d_{A_i}, E_i))^{\Delta_{i,s}(0)})^\alpha) \quad (7)$$

$$= f(m) e(g, g)^{xy_s} / \prod_{i \in S} (e(g^{\frac{q(i)}{t_i}}, g^{st_i})^{\Delta_{i,s}(0)\alpha}) \quad (8)$$

$$= f(m) e(g, g)^{xy_s} / \prod_{i \in S} (e(g, g)^{sq_i})^{\Delta_{i,s}(0)\alpha} \quad (9)$$

$$= f(m), m = f_x^{-1}(f(m)). \quad (10)$$

The Security Analysis

Theorem 1. If the Modified Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem is hard, then our attribute-based encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure.

Proof. Suppose A is a polynomial-time adversary, and he can success with advantage ε , then we can construct a scheme B to resolve the Modified Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem with advantage ε by calling A . The following is the proceed:

B sets the groups (G, G_T) be bilinear map groups of order $p > 2^k$ and let $e: G \times G \rightarrow G_T$ denote a bilinear map. Let g be a generator for G , and he is given the tuple $(A, B, C, Z) = (g^a, g^b, g^c, Z)$.

B runs A to obtain a challenge attributes set α .

Setup. B sets the public key as follows. He sets $Y = e(g, A) = e(g, g)^a$. For all attributes $i \in \alpha$, he sets $T_i = C^{t_i} = g^{ct_i}$ for random t_i , and for all $i \in U - \alpha$, he sets $T_i = g^{\omega_i}$ for random ω_i .

phase1

SecretKey Extract. A makes requests for secret key for attributes set γ . If $|\gamma \cap \alpha| < d$. Set three sets Γ, Γ_1, S , where:

$$\Gamma = \gamma \cap \alpha, \Gamma \subseteq \Gamma_1 \subseteq \gamma \quad (11)$$

$$|\Gamma_1| = d - 1, \quad (12)$$

set

$$S = \Gamma_1 \cup \{0\}. \quad (13)$$

We can randomly define the secret key for Γ_1 as follows:

For $i \in \Gamma$, Set

$$D_i = g^{s_i}. \quad (14)$$

Where s_i is chosen randomly.

For $i \in \Gamma_1 - \Gamma$, Set

$$D_i = g^{\frac{\lambda_i}{a_i}}. \quad (15)$$

Where λ_i is chosen randomly.

Then from the definition, B have chosen a $d-1$ degree polynomial $q(x)$ by choose $(d-1)$ random value and set $q(0) = a$. Especially, $i \in \Gamma, q(i) = c t_i s_i$, and for $i \in \Gamma_1 - \Gamma, q(i) = \lambda_i$.

B can define the other secret key D_i :

$$D_i = \left(\prod_{j \in \Gamma} C^{\frac{t_j s_j \Delta_{j,S}(i)}{a_i}} \right) \left(\prod_{j \in \Gamma_1 - \Gamma} g^{\frac{\lambda_j \Delta_{j,S}(i)}{a_i}} \right) Y^{\frac{\Delta_{0,S}(i)}{a_i}}. \quad (16)$$

Secret Value Extract. A asks a secret value for attributes set β , B divides $\beta = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_n)$, and acts as each authority, chooses computes $y_k = g_{sk_k}(\beta_k), (k=1, 2, \dots, n)$, then chooses an entity to get a $nr+1$ -sibling intractable function h satisfying $h(y_k) = x, (k=1, 2, \dots, n)$ and x is sent to entity A .

Public Key Extract. Publish one-way trapdoor function f with x as its trapdoor.

Challenge. A submit two challenge message M_1, M_0 to B , and B chooses a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$. The ciphertext is output as:

$$C = (C_0, C_1, C_2) = (\alpha, f(m_b) \cdot Y, E_i = B_i^t \ i \in \alpha). \quad (17)$$

phase2 B acts exactly as it did in phase 1.

Guess If A correctly guess the bit b , B will decide that the tuple (A, B, C, Z) is the Modified Bilinear Diffie-Hellman tuple, else it is not.

From the above analysis, we find that the advantage of B is equal to the advantage of A .

Theorem 2. If f is one-way trapdoor function and h is a k -sibling intractable function, then our attribute-based encryption scheme is secure against malicious central authority.

Conclusion

In order to mitigate the key escrow, this paper gives a new approach which adds new secret value to the user by the attribute authorities, and the central authority doesn't know the secret value. Compared with the general multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme, our approach is simple, and the length of the ciphertext and the public key published to the sender is not increased.

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