Information Fake in Supply Chains

Abstract:

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In this paper, we set risk attitude into decision making research for the supply chain manage. We focus on the information management. We discuss the stable states and the stochastically stable distribution for the fake game in the supply chain. We find there always exist information fake behaviors of low-yield suppliers. And, the less risk averse suppliers are, the more information fake they use.

Info:

Periodical:

Edited by:

Yanwen Wu

Pages:

958-962

DOI:

10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.267.958

Citation:

J. Hong "Information Fake in Supply Chains", Advanced Materials Research, Vol. 267, pp. 958-962, 2011

Online since:

June 2011

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Price:

$35.00

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