Lightweight, Scalable and OS-Transparent Remote Attestation of Runtime Program

Article Preview

Abstract:

Secure channel technologies alone can not provide the sufficient protection to the server data as long as the server can not guarantee the trustworthiness of the client program which accesses the server. The current Trusted Computing solution offers the guarantee on the trustworthiness of the client program by evaluating the integrity of all executable elements on the client platform. However, this solution may not work effectively in the monolithic legacy and commodity operating system. This paper considers the remote attestation of program execution on the untrusted legacy platform. We propose an architecture, which (1) collects the run-time information of the client program in a secure, scalable and OS-transparent way, and (2) reports to the remote server the collected run-time information of the client program in a lightweight and secure way. The architecture achieves these features by exploiting the system virtualization technology, the existing VMI tools, and the time stamping functionality in TCG TPM. We give the detailed description of the architecture.

You might also be interested in these eBooks

Info:

Periodical:

Pages:

506-511

Citation:

Online since:

September 2012

Export:

Price:

Permissions CCC:

Permissions PLS:

Сopyright:

© 2012 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

Share:

Citation:

[1] S.C. Misra, and V.C. Bhavsar, Relationships between selected software measures and latent bug-density, In Proc. Conference on Computational Science and Its Applications, (2003).

DOI: 10.1007/3-540-44839-x_76

Google Scholar

[2] Trusted Computing Group. http: /www. trustedcomputinggroup. org.

Google Scholar

[3] F. Baiardi, D. Cilea, D. Sgandurra, and F. Ceccarelli, Measuring semantic integrity for remote attestation, In Proc. of the 2nd International Conference on Trusted Computing, (2009).

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-00587-9_6

Google Scholar

[4] A. Seshadri, M. Luk, N. Qu, and A. Perrig, SecVisor: A Tiny Hypervisor to Provide Lifetime Kernel Code Integrity for Commodity OSes, In ACM, SOSP Symposium, (2007).

DOI: 10.1145/1294261.1294294

Google Scholar

[5] S. Bahram, X.X. Jiang, Z. Wang, M. Grace, J.K. Li, D. Srinivasan, J.W. Rhee, and D. Y Xu, DKSM: Subverting Virtual Machine Introspection for Fun and Profit, In Proc. of the 29th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems, (2010).

DOI: 10.1109/srds.2010.39

Google Scholar

[6] C. Kil, E.C. Sezer, A. Azab, P. Ning, and X.L. Zhang, Remote Attestation to Dynamic System Properties: Towards Providing Complete System Integrity Evidence, in Proc. IEEE, DSN (2009).

DOI: 10.1109/dsn.2009.5270348

Google Scholar

[7] D. Schellekens, B. Wyseur, and B. Preneel, Remote Attestation on Legacy Operating Systems with Trusted Platform Modules, , In Science of Computer Programming 74(1-2), pp.13-22, (2008).

DOI: 10.1016/j.scico.2008.09.005

Google Scholar

[8] B. Wyseur, RE-TRUST: Trustworthy Execution of SW on Remote Untrusted Platforms, In Highlights of the Information Security Solutions Europe 2009 Conference (ISSE 2009).

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-8348-9363-5_33

Google Scholar

[9] P. Barham, B. Dragovic, K. Fraser, S. Hand, T. Harris, A. Ho, R. Neugebauer, I. Pratt, and A. Warfield, Xen and the art of virtualization, In Proc. ACM SOSP, (2003).

DOI: 10.1145/945445.945462

Google Scholar

[10] TPM Main Part 3 Commands, http: /www. trustedcomputinggroup. org.

Google Scholar