Collusion-Resistant Spectrum Allocation Based on Pricing Game and Multi-Stage Auction

Abstract:

With the urgent needs of improving spectrum’s efficiency, dynamic spectrum allocation based on auction has become a popular method, which makes unlicensed users to use the vacant spectrum released by primary users. However, the collusion behavior between unlicensed users harms system’s efficiency and profit. Although many kinds of mechanism have been proposed to solve this problem, resisting collusion is still a tough problem. In this paper, we study the nature of collusion behavior and revenue, and model a multi-stage auction for centralized spectrum allocation. In order to balance the collusion-resistance and revenue-optimization, we propose an algorithm with unit price priority and one step revenue optimization, which can combat collusion between unlicensed users and encourage them to compete with each other so that improve system’s total profit to some degree. With the simulation results, our algorithm shows a good performance on collusion-resistance and system’s revenue comparing with the other two algorithms.

• Periodical: Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 198-199)
• Pages: 1588-1593
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.198-199.1588
• Online since: September 2012
• Authors: Ye Tian, Lin Ma, Xue Zhi Tan
• Keywords: Auction Theory, Cognitive Radio (CR), Collusion-Resistance, Spectrum Allocation

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