Auction Methods of Homogeneous Goods such as Mine and Energy Material

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Multi-object auctions usually involve the sale of many homogeneous or heterogeneous objects. Aiming at homogeneous goods auction (such as mine auction, energy material auction), this paper introduces the research history and the newest research trends, and presents many widespread theoretical and applications problems. Moreover, assumptions, main ideas, and conclusions of literature related to homogeneous goods auction are reviewed and commented.

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556-560

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December 2012

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© 2013 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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