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Total Amount Control of Pollutant and Allocation of Total Permitted Pollution Discharge Capacity

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Abstract:

Total permitted pollution discharge capacity (TPPDC) is a special scarce resource. The fairness and effectiveness of allocating TPPDC are the basis of pollutant gross control, pollution treatment and environmental sustainable development. Studies have demonstrated that free allocation, public auction and sale on wances are tree efficient and useful methods to allocate TPPDC. This paper presents widespread theoretical and applications problems for the study on these three methods in order to introduce the research history and the newest research trends of allocating TPPDC. Moreover, assumptions, main ideas, and conclusions of literature related to these three kinds of methods are reviewed and commented.

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Periodical:

Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 246-247)

Pages:

653-657

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.246-247.653

Citation:

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Online since:

December 2012

Authors:

Cong Jun Rao, Qing Zhang, Jian Ping Gan

Keywords:

Multi-Unit Auction, Total Amount Control of Pollutant, Total Permitted Pollution Discharge Capacity (TPPDC)

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© 2013 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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