The Strategic Interaction on Endogenous Infinite Lattice and the Simulation

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Abstract. This paper considers strategic interaction model based on the endogenous infinite lattice. We studied how the relationship between the cost of link formation and the payoff influenced the equilibrium structure. The main contribution is putting the endogenous network and the strategic interaction on the endogenous infinite lattice together, and giving the equilibrium structure with different parameters. The equilibrium structure has already been tested by the simulation system.

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1768-1773

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December 2012

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© 2013 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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