How to Enhance MIFARE System Security in the Current Crypto-1 Broken Status

Ying Ching Chiu; Wen Bing Horng

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.284-287.3433

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HomeApplied Mechanics and MaterialsApplied Mechanics and Materials Vols. 284-287How to Enhance MIFARE System Security in the...

How to Enhance MIFARE System Security in the Current Crypto-1 Broken Status

Abstract:

MIFARE is convenient contactless smart card, however a lot of studies recently indicated that, its encryption Crypto-1 can be broken. Even though the key authentication mechanism of MIFARE has been seriously affected, millions of MIFARE are still in use worldwide. Under the circumstances that, MIFARE card security vulnerability cannot be ignored while upgrading the MIFARE cards within a short period of time is impossible, it is practical to consider other ways to minimize the risk and possible damages.

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Periodical:

Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 284-287)

Pages:

3433-3437

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.284-287.3433

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Online since:

January 2013

Authors:

Ying Ching Chiu, Wen Bing Horng

Keywords:

Contactless Smart Card, Crypto-1, MIFARE, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)

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