Protocols for Message Authentication from a Weak Secret

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An authentication protocol is a procedure by which a sender tries to convey n bits of information, which we call an input message, to a receiver. An adversary controls the network over which the sender and the receiver talk and may change any message before it reaches its destination. This paper deals with the simple scenario where two parties, Alice and Bob, communicate and want to assure that the message received by Bob is the one sent by Alice. Unconditional cryptographic security cannot be generated simply from scratch, but must be based on some given primitive to start with. In this paper, we introduce a message authentication protocol with unconditional cryptographic security. More precisely, we give protocols using a weakly secret key allowing for the exchange of authenticated messages.

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2892-2896

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August 2013

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© 2013 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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