Stability Analysis of Supply Chain Cooperation Contract under Asymmetric Information

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Abstract:

The stability of cooperation contract is the result of abandon opportunistic behavior in the process of repeated games among the enterprise and the other subjects in the supply chain from long-term interests, and is also the foundation of healthy development for the whole supply chain. But in real life cooperation contract instability everywhere for a variety of reasons, such as ethical considerations, institutional factors, cultural factors and special reasons during the transition period and so on. From the perspective of information economics and game theory, the main game process of cooperation between enterprise and the other subjects in supply chain is not only the game of information, but also the game of interests. Information structure and the interesting structure are the important factors for the subjects of the game of the implementation of decisions and the basic contractual constraints for cooperative game equilibrium. Cooperation behaviors among the enterprise and the other subjects in the supply chain were studied on the basis of game theory, and the stability of cooperation contract is also being discussed in this paper.

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794-798

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December 2010

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© 2011 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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