Survey on Cooperation Incentive Mechanisms in MANETs

Abstract:

A lack of centralized administrator has made communications in mobile ad hoc networks relied on cooperation of mobile nodes. Apparently, their limited energy cannot provide a sustained supply for consumption on operations, such as relaying, forwarding, etc. This may cause the self-ish behaviors of non-cooperative nodes, resulting in degradation on the stability or reliability of routing. The self-ishness worsens because of node mobility. Most existing works were considering external profits and inner motivations. In this paper, we analyzed three kinds of incentive mechanisms based on virtual currency, reputation and game theory, respectively. We compared application scenarios and performance of these mechanisms, and discussed their limitations. Finally we proposed possible directions for the future research on the incentive mechanisms in mobile ad hoc networks.

• Periodical: Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 513-517)
• Pages: 1811-1818
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.513-517.1811
• Online since: February 2014
• Authors: Xiao Fei Wang*, Ying Cai, Zhuo Li
• Keywords: Cooperation Incentives, Game Theory, MANETs, Reputation, Virtual Currency

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