Weakness and Improvement of an Efficient Key Agreement Protocol

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Xiao and Li proposed protocol XKAS and claimed it to be an efficient and secure two-party authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. In this letter, we show that the protocol is vulne- rable to a key-compromise impersonation attack. We also proposed XKAS+, which can withstand such attacks. The new protocol enjoys this property at the expense of a slight increase in computational workload with respect to the original version.

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1816-1819

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August 2014

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© 2014 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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