Research on Brain Drain of Energy Environmental Protection Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Model

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Abstract:

Due to the special nature of energy environmental protection industry, staff loss is very common in energy environmental protection enterprises, especially in the middle-high level class. Through building evolutionary game model based on the problem of employee turnover between employees and enterprises, we find out that the reason of the flow of talents in energy environmental protection enterprises is that the payment and promotion prospects after resign is better than before. In order to prevent the excessive flow of the talents, energy environmental protection enterprises should moderately improve the remuneration of its staffs, develop employees' promotion space and improve the breach penalty of those initiative employees.

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3620-3625

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August 2014

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© 2014 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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