Resource Sharing and Allocation in P2P Social Networks

Abstract:

this paper investigated resource sharing and allocation in P2P social networks which based on game theory. Firstly, resources are divided into two categories: Public goods (PG) and Club goods (CG). The PG has the following characteristics: self-less, Non-exclusive and un-competitive; but the CG has some self-ish, exclusive and competitive. The PG only to get the sharing fixed costs and transaction costs, but the CG needs to obtain more benefits over than costs. We demonstrated that when providers sharing resource is CG within sharing capacities can achieve the maximum benefits and Nash equilibrium. Secondly, peers are divided into two sets: friends set (FS) and strangers set (SS), providers allocate the CG in different sets within different pricing by the average price. Finally, simulations analyzed benefits of peers sharing the PG or the CG, and then discussed resource allocation in different sets within different payment strategies and resource pricing in the same set.

• Periodical: Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volume 610)
• Pages: 588-594
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.610.588
• Online since: August 2014
• Authors: Qing Feng Zhang*, Sheng Wang, Dan Liao
• Keywords: Club Goods, Nash Equilibrium, P2P Social Networks, Public Goods, Resource Allocation

References

[1] E. Adar and B. A. Huberman, Free riding on Gnutella, First Monday, vol. 5, no. 10, 2000. 42-68.

DOI: 10.5210/fm.v5i10.792

[2] Michal Feldman and John Chuang, Overcoming Free-Riding Behavior in Peer-to-PeerSystems, ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 5, no. 4, July (2005).

DOI: 10.1145/1120717.1120723

[3] Yuling Li, YuhuaLiu, Kaihua Xu, Wei Chen, Analysis and Balanced Mechanism on Free-rider In P2P Networks, 2010 Second International Conference on Computer Modeling and Simulation.

DOI: 10.1109/iccms.2010.494

[4] Michal Feldman, Christos Papadimitriou, John Chuang, and Ion Stoica, Free-Riding and Whitewashing inPeer-to-Peer Systems, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 24, no. 5, May (2006).

DOI: 10.1109/jsac.2006.872882

[5] Jaeok Park Mihaela vander Schaar Pricing and Incentives in peer-to-peer Networks, IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE INFOCOM 2010 proceedings.

DOI: 10.1109/infcom.2010.5461952

[6] C. Buragohain, D. Agrawal, and S. Suri, A game theoretic frameworkfor incentives in P2P systems, in Proc. 3rd Int. Conf. Peer-to-PeerComput, 2003, p.48–56.

DOI: 10.1109/ptp.2003.1231503

[7] T. B. Ma, S. C. M. Lee, J. C. S. Lui, and D. K. Y. Yau, Incentive andservice differentiation in P2P networks: A game theoretic approach, IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., vol. 14, no. 5, p.978–991, Oct. (2006).

DOI: 10.1109/tnet.2006.882904

[8] Han-Yang Quek, Kay Chen Tan, and Arthur Tay, Public Goods Provision: An Evolutionary GameTheoretic Study Under Asymmetric Information, IEEE Transanctions on Coputational Intelligence and ai in Games, vol. 1, no. 2, June (2009).

DOI: 10.1109/tciaig.2009.2018832

[9] Kreps, D. M. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, New Jerse3y, (1990).