Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

Abstract:

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

• Periodical: Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volume 697)
• Pages: 482-487
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.697.482
• Online since: November 2014
• Authors: Shi Ying Jiang, Chun Yan Ma
• Keywords: Green Supply Chain, Incomplete Information, Product Greenness, Revenue Sharing Contract, Risk Aversion

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