Analysis on Security Proof of Two Key Agreement Protocols

Abstract:

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Recently, Tseng proposed two group key agreement protocols which are claimed to be provably secure against passive attackers and impersonation attacks over authenticated channel. In each of these works, a security proof of the proposed protocol was presented. In this paper, we revisit Tseng’s security proof and show that the reduction in the proof is invalid. As the replacement, we give a new security proof.

Info:

Periodical:

Edited by:

Wenya Tian and Linli Xu

Pages:

531-535

DOI:

10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.186.531

Citation:

H. H. Zhou and M. H. Zheng, "Analysis on Security Proof of Two Key Agreement Protocols", Advanced Materials Research, Vol. 186, pp. 531-535, 2011

Online since:

January 2011

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Price:

$35.00

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