Analysis on Security Proof of Two Key Agreement Protocols

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Abstract:

Recently, Tseng proposed two group key agreement protocols which are claimed to be provably secure against passive attackers and impersonation attacks over authenticated channel. In each of these works, a security proof of the proposed protocol was presented. In this paper, we revisit Tseng’s security proof and show that the reduction in the proof is invalid. As the replacement, we give a new security proof.

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531-535

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January 2011

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© 2011 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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