A Study on Game of Carbon Trade Risks under Non-Market Function

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Abstract:

This paper through the analysis on status and barriers of carbon trade in China and factors for price, made a study on the game of carbon trade risks under non-market function. This paper used the reverse signal transduction model, analyzes the path selection of emissions measures under the government mandatory policy. And it established the two stages carbon trading competition model, which reveals the best effort level and the optimal referral reward (incentive problems) under the voluntary emissions of carbon trading. And then it established the characteristic carbon trade mode of China providing reference to the economic development of China’s future carbon emission trade market.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 374-377)

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382-385

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Online since:

October 2011

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© 2012 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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