Dynamic Research of Construction Safety with Building Materials

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Abstract:

Safety regulation is an important approach to secure the constructing process. A three-player regulation evolutionary game model is built, the stability analysis and simulation results show that evolutionary equilibrium (EE) does not exist, providing a convenient way for regulation policy making.

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339-342

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March 2012

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© 2012 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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