The Game Analysis on Moral Hazard in the Safety Supervision of Nuclear Power

Abstract:

The development of nuclear power has become an important way to solve the problems of environment and energy in many countries, also it is an important policy to solve the problems of e energy structure in China. But moral hazard in the safety supervision of nuclear power has happened. By adopting the game analysis method and establishing the game model of moral hazard in the safety supervision of nuclear power, the paper analysis the model with static mixed game and finite iterations of dynamic game. As a result, it can lower the moral hazard if the governments strengthen the punishment in violation of safety rules and reduce the supervision cost.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 518-523)
• Pages: 1014-1017
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.518-523.1014
• Online since: May 2012
• Authors: Qiu Sheng Huang, Sheng Wang
• Keywords: Game, Moral Hazard, Nuclear Power, Safety Supervision

References

[1] Xiuqing Wang. The World Nuclear Power Renaissance milepost [M]. Beijing: Science Press, 2008: 49-52.

[2] John (UK), Eatwell. The new Palgrave Dictionary of economics: Volume third [M]. Beijing: Economic Science Press, 1992: 588-589.

[3] Weiying Zhang. Game theory and information economics[M]. Shanghai: Shanghai people's publishing house, 1996.

[4] Jiongxing Lu, Xingnv Zhang. China's nuclear safety supervision problems and countermeasures [C]. 2011 national environment and Resources Law Conference