Waste Military Air Material Reverse Logistics System Multi-Objective Incentive and Monitoring Mechanism

Ke Wang; Da Li Jiang; Jun Liu; Li Zhang

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.518-523.3631

Paper Titles

Source Separation Research of Municipal Solid Waste
p.3609

Study on the Layout and Structure of the Waste Electronic Products Recycling Network
p.3613

Study on Wet Treatment Process of Waste Printed Circuit Boards
p.3621

The Progress of Waste Filter Bag Recycling and Reusing
p.3627

Waste Military Air Material Reverse Logistics System Multi-Objective Incentive and Monitoring Mechanism
p.3631

Groundwater Baseline Quality in the Minqin Basin, NW China
p.3643

Groundwater Recharge Environments and Hydrogeochemical Evolution in Beijing, China: Multi-Tracer Approach
p.3647

Impact of the Three Gorges Reservoir Flood Prevention Dispatching Tohydrologic Information and Disaster Information in Dongting Lake Area
p.3652

Improved Unsteady Water Quality Model for Plain River Network and its Application
p.3662

HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vols. 518-523Waste Military Air Material Reverse Logistics...

Waste Military Air Material Reverse Logistics System Multi-Objective Incentive and Monitoring Mechanism

Abstract:

In this article, based on the principal-agent theory and introducing an auxiliary observing variable sets up an optimal model of principal-agent relationship between the waste military air materials reverse logistics demand side and the logistics service provider，and analyzes the principal-agent problems in the waste military air materials reverse logistics such as moral hazard and incentive monitoring mechanism designing owing to the asymmetric information．Furthermore，the papers analyzes the agent costs of outsourcer and incentive intensity coefficient of provider and points out that the designing of incentive monitoring mechanism for provider must reflect the influences of provider specialty the change of external environment and the agent costs of the waste military air materials reverse logistics demand side.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 518-523)

Pages:

3631-3640

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.518-523.3631

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Online since:

May 2012

Authors:

Ke Wang, Da Li Jiang, Jun Liu, Li Zhang

Keywords:

Incentive Mechanism, Monitoring Mechanism, Multi-Objective Principal-Agent, Reverse Logistic, Waste Military Air Material

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