A Dynamic Game Approach for Analyzing the Coalitional Stability of Cascaded Hydropower Stations

Abstract:

A game model is proposed to discuss the possible coalition structures of hydropower stations. The stable coalition structures in different contexts of electricity markets are derived on basic of numerical simulation using the raw data of three hydropower stations on the middle and lower reaches of some river in China's south-western region as a case. The coalitional stability is analyzed by a dynamic cooperation game approach using the conception of LCS and EPCS. The total purchase power fees of the grid in three coalition structures are calculated and compared to analyze the effects of coalition structures on the social benefit.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 562-564)
• Pages: 1544-1548
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.562-564.1544
• Online since: August 2012
• Authors: Heng Li Song, Chao Yuan Yue
• Keywords: Cascaded Hydropower Stations, Coalitional Stability, Dynamic Game

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