Investment in Regional Environmental Governance: A Game between the Government and the Enterprise

Abstract:

The environmental governance behaviors of the government and the enterprise is analyzed by a game theoretical model. The Nash equilibrium is discussed under three different cases. If the government has a relatively large budget, it will satisfy its preference and the enterprise contribute nothing; if the government has a moderate budget, it will contribute all to the environmental governance while the enterprise still contribute nothing; if the government has a relatively small budget, it will contribute all, and the enterprise will spend part of its budget to satisfy its preference.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 838-841)
• Pages: 2639-2642
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.838-841.2639
• Online since: November 2013
• Authors: Min Min Teng, Chuan Feng Han*
• Keywords: Enterprise, Game Theory, Government, Regional Environmental Governance

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