Game Analysis of Reverse Supply Chain Based on Government Regulation

Jian Cao; Li Ling Hu; Qing Qin Yao

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.915-916.1528

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HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vols. 915-916Game Analysis of Reverse Supply Chain Based on...

Game Analysis of Reverse Supply Chain Based on Government Regulation

Abstract:

Extended producer responsibility (EPR) system is an environmental protection strategy to recycle end-of-life products. A dynamic analysis model between the government and the reverse supply chain (RSC) system operated under the EPR instrument was established. Game theory was applied to analyze the optimal fiscal policy of the government and the optimal decision of the participating enterprises. It concludes that governments environmental regulation is effective to improve the manufacturers remanufacturing rate and the recyclers effort-extent.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 915-916)

Pages:

1528-1531

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.915-916.1528

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Online since:

April 2014

Authors:

Jian Cao, Li Ling Hu, Qing Qin Yao

Keywords:

Design for Environment, Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR), Incentive Mechanism, Stackelberg Game

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