Implementation and Detection Tests for Countermeasure – Annulled Hardware Trojan on FPGA

Abstract:

A hardware Trojan is a circuit that is incorporated into LSI by a malicious designer. The LSI, which was infected with a hardware Trojan, acts following its specifications in normal operations. However, when Trojan trigger is actuated, subversive activities, such as leak of important information, occur. A software Trojan can be theoretically removed. However, since a hardware Trojan is physically incorporated into LSI, it is difficult to find from outside and it cannot be removed. The present study verifies the validity and effect of the countermeasure-annulled hardware Trojan by performing detection tests.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volume 918)
• Pages: 268-273
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.918.268
• Online since: April 2014
• Authors: Masaya Yoshikawa*, Takaya Tukadaira
• Keywords: AES Algorithm, Countermeasure Circuits, Cryptographic Circuit, Detection Tests, Hardware Trojan

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