A Self-Healing Cryptosystem Design Prevent from Side-Channel Attack

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Abstract:

Side-channel attack is a non destructive physical attacks method. In view of existing cryptosystem of Side-channel leakage of safe hidden trouble, this paper presents a kind of self-healing properties with the cryptosystem design method. Firstly, a new masking method is proposed, and it restricts the side channel measurement by inserting some measure-disabled points into the cryptographic algorithm. And then, a masking update technique is applied for making the side-channel leakage invalid. Compared with previous countermeasures, our method has stronger ability of self-healing and it also resists to complex side-channel attack.

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200-204

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September 2012

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