Research on Statistical Innovation Based on the Game between Central Government and Local Government

Abstract:

Much of state statistical work is done by the local statistical organizations. The reliability of local statistical data is the core of statistical innovation. But, the care of local government and enterprises may be not identical with the target of statistical work. Statistical products must affect utilities of some people, so they may have motives to interfere with statistical affairs. The paper started with dominant rationality, and some game models were built based on the relationship between central government and local government. After analysis on these models, it points out that the new statistical system should be built to make benefit-related people separated from statistical work. That the benefit-related people have no access to interfering with statistical work is essential to ensure the statistical data quality.

• Periodical: Advanced Engineering Forum (Volumes 6-7)
• Pages: 757-762
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AEF.6-7.757
• Online since: September 2012
• Authors: Deng Bing Zhang
• Keywords: Dominant Rationality, Equilibrium, Game Theory, Statistical Innovation

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