Fishery Logistics Insurance Management Schemes

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The intense competition of global markets and consumers' high expectations forced enterprises to invest and concentrate on the relationship with their customers and suppliers. The growing interest in supply chain management, both in developed and developing countries in the fisheries. With the catastrophic events in the fisheries supply chain, the diversity of the fisheries risk and insurance issues become increasingly important. However, participants in the supply chain is a separate and independent economic entities, and only consider their own interests. In this article, the fisheries supply chain insurance contract on the basis of the model and the diversity of the fisheries risk and insurance policy issues, the behavior of each participant. In this article, the diversity of the fisheries supply chain risk and insurance process, the lack of sufficient knowledge of the fisheries supply chain contract signing or the exact probability of the insured event, the fisheries supply chain risk insurance companies use the information provided by the fisheries supply chain contract signature the signing of the contract or the behavior of the fisheries supply chain insurers of people insured or fisheries supply chain and fisheries supply chain in order to establish the parameters of the insurance contract of the fisheries supply chain.

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773-777

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September 2012

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