Analysis of Conspiracies between Contractors and Supervisors in Constructions

Lei Zhao; Sheng Zhong

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.121-126.4386

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HomeApplied Mechanics and MaterialsApplied Mechanics and Materials Vols. 121-126Analysis of Conspiracies between Contractors and...

Analysis of Conspiracies between Contractors and Supervisors in Constructions

Abstract:

Owners, contractors and supervisors are key members included in construction projects. There are two kinds of principal-agent relationships among the three parties. Out of the consideration of maximizing the interests of owners, the author of this article integrates the three parties--owners, contractors and supervisors into a mathematical model, designs corresponding anti-conspiracy constraint method to prevent the conspiracy act of contractors and supervisors, and studies the game relationship among the three parties--owners, contractors and supervisors using the principal - agent theory.

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Periodical:

Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 121-126)

Pages:

4386-4390

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.121-126.4386

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Online since:

October 2011

Authors:

Lei Zhao, Sheng Zhong

Keywords:

Conspiracy, Construction, Contractor, Principal-Agent Model, Supervisor

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References

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