The Economics Analysis of Large-Scale Project Organization

Abstract:

Large-scale projects have the features that large organization size, complex relationships between the organization and a serious information asymmetry between project participants. This study carries out in-depth economic analysis about large-scale projects organization, based on principal-agent theory and transaction cost theory from the perspective of new institutional economics, at the same time, establish the economic theoretical framework, it has positive significance to the rational design of the project contract and scientific analysis of the construction economic relations.

• Periodical: Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volume 147)
• Pages: 303-307
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.147.303
• Online since: December 2011
• Authors: Yong Hong Chen, Ning Xu
• Keywords: Economic Analysis, Neo-Institutional Economics, Principal-Agent Theory, Transactions Costs Theory

References

[1] Sun Xuna. Overview of the new institutional economics theory [J]. Theories, 2007, (7) : 51-55.

[2] Jensen, Michael C., William H. Meckling. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, (3): 305-310.

DOI: 10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x

[3] Wang xiaozhou. Construction project principal-agent relationship of economic analysis and incentive and restraint mechanism design [J]. Chinese science, 2004 (6) : 77-82.

[4] Xie jingchen, Wangting. Construction market information asymmetry and management countermeasures study [J]. Shanghai scientific management, 2006 (3) ：46-48.

[5] Zou xiaoHu, Tian jinxin, Zhou aimin contractor and cluster. The game of crowd partners [J]. Quantity economic and technological economic research, 2003, (8) : 87-90.

[6] QinXuan, ZhangCaiHong. Information asymmetry of the construction of market analysis of characteristics of several economic [J]. Architectural economy, 2005 (4) ：33-37.

[7] RenHong, MaWanMing. Based on the construction unit from the perspective of transaction cost analysis of construction project [J]. construction supervision, 2008, (9)：46-48.

[8] YangHuiXin, LiuMingYu. Technology changes and enterprise organization evolution [J]. Foreign economic and management, 2002，24（10）：8-17.

[9] LiJiaWei. A wholly state-owned company governance problems probing [J]. Journal of shenyang university of social science edition, 2008, 1 (1) : 92-96.

[10] ZhaoJie. Construction supply chain asymmetry information sharing [j]. journal of tongji university, Ph.D. Thesis, (2010).