Analysis of the Responsibility of Engineering Accidents from the Ethical Context of Engineers

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Abstract:

When project accidents happened, engineers will always become to the scapegoat, because the professional ethics of engineers require they to take the construction quality and public safety in the first place. However, a game analysis of every parties involved in the construction found that the business ethics and supervision system are equally important. So, it is unreasonably to attribute engineering accidents to the professional ethics of engineers unilateral and isolated. In order to solve the engineering accidents fundamentally, institutional building and ethics construction must be combined to a whole.

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3369-3373

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May 2012

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© 2012 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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