An Efficient Trustworthy Protected-Ring Model for UEFI Firmware

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Abstract:

A trustworthy protected-ring model for UEFI firmware is proposed and a prototype based on Intel Platform Innovation Framework is implemented in this paper. In addition to meet static security attributes such as integrity and authenticity proposed in trusted firmware, this model can also satisfy some dynamic security attributes such as control object’s operations on device or modifications on key data. Furthermore, this model is simple and efficient enough to meet firmware’s need for small size and fast boot.

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459-464

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January 2010

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© 2010 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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