Pricing Strategy of Cruise Companies

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Abstract:

This paper researches the product pricing problems of cruise companies in the oligopoly market, discusses a cooperative game model and a non cooperative game model, and gives equilibrium results of pricing game between two oligopoly companies by analyzing the solution of models.

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4579-4582

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August 2013

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© 2013 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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