Study on Tacit Collusion and Low-Price Equilibrium in Auctioning Total Permitted Pollution Discharge Capacity

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Abstract:

In this paper, a typical free allocation model of allocating Total Permitted Pollution Discharge Capacity (TPPDC) is analyzed, and a uniform price auction model with fixed supply by using a set of conditions and mechanism assumptions is presented. By theoretical analysising and examples validating, the conclusion can be drawn that the bidders collusion and low-price equilibrium will easily occur in this uniform price auction mechanism. So we give some improved methods based on the strategies of uncertain supply and optimized supply which can effectively restrain tacit collusion and reduce many low-price equilibriums.

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683-686

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September 2013

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© 2013 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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