Optimal Bidding Decision of Bidders in Homogeneous Goods Procurement

Zhong Wen Chen

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.415.726

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HomeApplied Mechanics and MaterialsApplied Mechanics and Materials Vol. 415Optimal Bidding Decision of Bidders in Homogeneous...

Optimal Bidding Decision of Bidders in Homogeneous Goods Procurement

Abstract:

In this paper, a uniform price auction mechanism for procuring homogeneous divisible goods is studied, and both nonlinear bidding strategy and linear bidding strategy of symmetric bidders are analyzed. And then the dominant relationship is discussed deeply between the two kinds of equilibrium bids. The results show that the nonlinear equilibrium bidding strategy dominates linear ones. Based on this analysis, several suggestions are given on how to make optimal decision making on bidding strategy choice for bidders.

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Periodical:

Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volume 415)

Pages:

726-729

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.415.726

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Online since:

September 2013

Authors:

Zhong Wen Chen

Keywords:

Bidding Strategy Choice, Divisible Goods Auction, Optimal Decision Making

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