An Evolutionary Game Model of the Establishment of Tracebility System in Food Supply Chain

Abstract:

For a two-echelon supply chain system which consists of upstream node enterprises and downstream node enterprises, cooperation mechanism between bounded rational upstream and downstream nodes through collaborative establishment and implementation of food traceability system was modeled based on evolutionary game theory. The study shows that the probability of cooperation between both sides has a a negative correlation with the total cost of establishment and positive correlations with the probability of risk occurrence, the total excess income and reduction in risk loss from cooperation of both sides, and the excess income from the establishment of one side. Cost shared by both sides should be positively related to the excess income they obtaine. And there are an optimal coefficient of total excess income allocation and an optimal coefficient of reduction in risk loss allocation to maximize the probability of cooperation.

• Periodical: Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 423-426)
• Pages: 2190-2195
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.423-426.2190
• Online since: September 2013
• Authors: Sai Tang
• Keywords: Cooperation Mechanism, Evolutionary Game, Food Supply Chain, Food Traceability System

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