Supply Chain Coordination under Asymmetric Disruptive Demand

Abstract:

Under the circumstance of disruptive demand, the decision-making and coordination of enterprise’s capacity is directly related to the efficiency of supply chain operation. On the basis of the baseline case, capacity reservation contract sees that the performance of decentralized supply chain is equal to the centralized supply chain, and better than the level of the optimal supply chain capacity under the wholesale price contract. For disruptive demand, this paper discusses the conditions of capacity expansion and supply chain coordination through the capacity reservation contract in two cases, i.e., symmetric disruptive information, asymmetric disruptive information, and compares the optimal capacity and the corresponding profit.

• Periodical: Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 44-47)
• Pages: 96-100
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.44-47.96
• Online since: December 2010
• Authors: Chuan Bo Zhu
• Keywords: Asymmetric Information, Capacity Reservation Contract, Disruptive Demand, Screening in Game Theory, Supply Chain Disruption, Wholesale Contract

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