The Power Plant Bidding Strategy in Contract Market

Fu Gui Dong

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.598.656

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HomeApplied Mechanics and MaterialsApplied Mechanics and Materials Vol. 598The Power Plant Bidding Strategy in Contract...

The Power Plant Bidding Strategy in Contract Market

Abstract:

Owing to the fact that the power can not be stored directly and the supply must meet the demand in real time, the price of electricity is more volatile than other commodities. In order to hedge the risk, the power plant can sign the power sale contracts with big customers by the promissory price. Using the Bayesian equilibrium theory, this paper establishes the bidding models on two power plants competing for selling the electricity to the big customer. The computing result shows that the power plant’s optimal bidding strategy equals to the mean of the competitor’s ceiling bidding price and its own marginal cost.

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Periodical:

Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volume 598)

Pages:

656-660

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.598.656

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Online since:

July 2014

Authors:

Fu Gui Dong*

Keywords:

Bidding, Contract Market, Electricity Market, Game Theory

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* - Corresponding Author

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