Game Theory Analysis of Private Supply in Farmland Water Conservancy

Abstract:

From the perspective of quasi-public goods, this paper studies the investment of the farmland water infrastructure, and uses game theory to analyze government and private investors. It is found that in the presence of investment constraints, the government can not complete quasi-public goods investment in farmland water infrastructure independently, so the government needs to provide appropriate policies to increase the marginal benefit of private investors to attract private cooperation. Then this paper compares spontaneous investments and incentive investment from private investors, and concludes with policy recommendations.

• Periodical: Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 641-642)
• Pages: 279-282
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.641-642.279
• Online since: September 2014
• Authors: Xiao Yu Ji*, Min Song
• Keywords: Farmland Water Conservancy, Game Theory Analysis, Private Supply, Quasi-Public Goods

References

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