An Online E-Payment System Applying to Auto Insurance Based on Proxy Blind Signature

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Nowadays, the E-payment system can be extensively used in the ecommerce applications through the Internet as a payment method. So the E-payment system’s security is very important. In this paper, the E-payment based on proxy blind signature is discussed, and an E-payment system applying to auto insurance based on proxy blind signature is proposed. The system solves the problem that the central bank can easily cancel the signing power of issuing banks and resist collusion attack. Meanwhile, anonymity of the banks and withdrawer can be protected in our system. The trace of e-cash and withdrawer can be realized. By security analyzing, it shows the new scheme is an efficient and safe e-payment system with multi-banks applying to purchase auto insurance system.

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2776-2783

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September 2014

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© 2014 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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