The Feasible Coalitional Structures in the Weighted Cooperative Games

Abstract:

In cooperative games, the formation of coalitional structure and their allocation are important problems. This paper firstly for participants with different position or itself by the relative inseparable coalition composition, put forward weighted cooperative game. The formations of feasible coalition structure are presented. On the basis of the revenues in all feasible coalition structures for every participant, their allocation indexes are determined and based on the allocation indexes, the revenue of the biggest coalitional structure be assigned to each participant. This method's reasonability represents that the participants' allocation indexes are from the competition among individuals and maximizing the overall revenue reflects all participants' cooperation.

• Periodical: Applied Mechanics and Materials (Volumes 713-715)
• Pages: 1963-1966
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMM.713-715.1963
• Online since: January 2015
• Authors: Shao Bai Chen*, Zhao Di Hu, Man Zhang
• Keywords: Cooperative Game, Feasible Coalitional Structure, Weighted Cooperative Game

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