Optical Fault Injection Attacks against Cipher Chip

Hong Sheng Wang; Dao Gang Ji; Yang Zhang; Kai Yan Chen; Kai Song

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.1044-1045.1498

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HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vols. 1044-1045Optical Fault Injection Attacks against Cipher...

Optical Fault Injection Attacks against Cipher Chip

Abstract:

Cipher chips, such as microprocessors, are playing the important role in most cryptosystems, and implementing many public cryptographic algorithms. However, Side channel attacks pose serious threats to Cipher chips. Optical Side channel attack is a new kind of method against cipher chips. Two methods are presented in this paper, which shows how to implement optical fault injection attacks against RSA and AES algorithms running on AT89C52 microchip, and demonstrates how to exploit secret information under attack.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 1044-1045)

Pages:

1498-1502

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.1044-1045.1498

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Online since:

October 2014

Authors:

Hong Sheng Wang*, Dao Gang Ji, Yang Zhang, Kai Yan Chen, Kai Song

Keywords:

AES, AT89C52, Cipher Chip, Optical Fault Injection Attack, RSA

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* - Corresponding Author

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