A Supervision Model Study of Non-Profit Government Investment Project under Information Asymmetry

Abstract:

The develop policy and management issues of Non-profit Government Investment Project, hereinafter referred to as NGIP, are important parts of Chinese investment management system reform. The study of information asymmetry generated during the management process of NGIP, is becoming more and more popular now. Based on the features of NGIP under information asymmetry, this article firstly analyzes the generation mechanism and the influences of asymmetric information. We then built up a game model towards the supervision process of NGIP. The key factors which influence the subjects most are quantified and compared in this paper. Supervision countermeasures are proposed towards information asymmetry problems, among which the information construction and improved supervision system are emphasized.

• Periodical: Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 1065-1069)
• Pages: 2439-2444
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.1065-1069.2439
• Online since: December 2014
• Authors: Yun Na Wu, Zi Shan Hu*, Jin Ying Zhang
• Keywords: Engineering Quality, Information Asymmetry, Non-Profit Government Investment Project, Supervision

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