Game Analysis of Environmental Regulation Performance of FDI Competition under Green Economy Perspective

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Abstract:

Based on the perspective of green economy and FDI competition, this article establishes revenue matrix game, resolves game revenue function between stakeholders, by defining the performance of environmental regulation stakeholders variable. The results show that in the light of heavy economic performance as the target function, the local government has to relax the environment regulation as the means to fight the mobility factor motivation . In addition, the local government’s environmental regulation will actively promote enterprise technological innovation to improve the performance of environmental regulation.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 1073-1076)

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2669-2674

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December 2014

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© 2015 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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