Stability of Evolutionary Equilibrium of Incentives for Teachers under Incomplete Information

Lu Shi

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.230-232.496

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HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vols. 230-232Stability of Evolutionary Equilibrium of...

Stability of Evolutionary Equilibrium of Incentives for Teachers under Incomplete Information

Abstract:

Higher education institution is chose as studying object to examine the incentive issue of teachers, which is of great theoretical and practical significance for the development of managing model for human resource for inspiring the latent of teacher. The asymmetric evolutionary game between higher education institution and teacher is studied based on imperfect information and the dynamic evolutionary equilibrium is also derived. Some cases are discussed in this paper and cooperation will be optimal selection if both sides will re-adjustment the distribution of benefits and this process of cooperation is an evolutionary process.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 230-232)

Pages:

496-500

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.230-232.496

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Online since:

May 2011

Authors:

Lu Shi

Keywords:

Evolutionary Equilibrium, Incentive Mechanism, Incomplete Information, Stability Analysis

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References

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