Control Research of Engineering Safety Supervision Based on Rent-Seeking and Game Theory

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Abstract:

In order to further discussing the problem of the construction engineering safety supervision, this paper analyzed the cost and benefit on the rent-seeking behavior of engineering safety supervision using rent-seeking theory. Two game models of engineering safety supervision rent-seeking was established and some suggestions were given.

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Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 243-249)

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1416-1420

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May 2011

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© 2011 Trans Tech Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved

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