Internal Incentive Mechanism of Public Agent-Construction Enterprises Based on Common Agency Model

Zhong Bing Wu; Bing Yao; Yi Sheng Liu; Hong Di Wang

doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.243-249.6268

Paper Titles

The FEM Analysis and Optimization Design of Main Beam of Horizontal Directional Drilling
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Analysis and Research of Wind Environment of Energy Saving Buildings
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Reuse of Building Construction and Demolition Waste, a Xi’an Example
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On the Negative Impact of Defects Liability Period
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Internal Incentive Mechanism of Public Agent-Construction Enterprises Based on Common Agency Model
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Compare Business Process between Construction and Manufacturing on the Application of ERP
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Applied Research on Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation of BOT Projects in the Transfer Phase
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Research on the Social Discount Rate for the Whole Life Cycle Engineering Cost Management
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Integrated Management of Construction Project Based on Knowledge Base
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HomeAdvanced Materials ResearchAdvanced Materials Research Vols. 243-249Internal Incentive Mechanism of Public...

Internal Incentive Mechanism of Public Agent-Construction Enterprises Based on Common Agency Model

Abstract:

Common agency is the main feature of public sector’s internal incentive mechanism. As the public sector, endogenous features of PACE will lead to defects of internal incentive system. Regarding the public agent-construction enterprise as an agent of two principals which are client and government, a common agent model is constructed and analyzed in-depthly. The findings of this paper clarify two aspects of theoretical basis for the regulatory policy: 1) the optimal conditions of an incentive contract; 2) the substitution relationship of the tasks of two principals causes distortion to the incentive mechanism and leads to incentive efficiency loss.