Internal Incentive Mechanism of Public Agent-Construction Enterprises Based on Common Agency Model

Abstract:

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Common agency is the main feature of public sector’s internal incentive mechanism. As the public sector, endogenous features of PACE will lead to defects of internal incentive system. Regarding the public agent-construction enterprise as an agent of two principals which are client and government, a common agent model is constructed and analyzed in-depthly. The findings of this paper clarify two aspects of theoretical basis for the regulatory policy: 1) the optimal conditions of an incentive contract; 2) the substitution relationship of the tasks of two principals causes distortion to the incentive mechanism and leads to incentive efficiency loss.

Info:

Periodical:

Advanced Materials Research (Volumes 243-249)

Edited by:

Chaohe Chen, Yong Huang and Guangfan Li

Pages:

6268-6272

DOI:

10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.243-249.6268

Citation:

Z. B. Wu et al., "Internal Incentive Mechanism of Public Agent-Construction Enterprises Based on Common Agency Model", Advanced Materials Research, Vols. 243-249, pp. 6268-6272, 2011

Online since:

May 2011

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Price:

$35.00

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